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1
INTRODUCTION
The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference
held in Paris, France, is widely lauded as an epochal
stride in the race against climate change. The Paris
Agreement has been described as ‘historic, durable and
ambitious’.1 In many ways, the applause is justified.
At the very least, there was a chink in the South –
North divide which had hitherto prevented concrete
undertakings by Parties. Now, both developing and
developed States have committed themselves to hold
the ‘increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2oC above pre-industrial levels’ and strive for
the 1.5oC mark.2 This chink notwithstanding, the
dichotomy remains. It remains in the glaring
developmental disparity between the global South and
North; it remains in the different emphases of Parties
as to how climate change mitigation and adaptation is
to be achieved; it remains in the South’s insistence for
‘more’ commitments from industrialized States and
the North’s unreadiness to yield; most importantly, it
remains in the conflicting normative underpinnings
of Parties’ positions.3 No doubt, the Paris Agreement
(PA) is a product of  compromise. But, what sort of
compromise? A ‘compromise based on solidarity’ or
a ‘compromise induced by power’?4 The UNFCCC
Environmentally Sound Technology development and
transfer (EST transfer) framework and its chequered
history is an apposite case study to explore the kind of
compromise at play in the global climate regime.5
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) describes EST transfer as a ‘broad set of
processes covering the flows of  know-how, experience
and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate
change amongst different stakeholders … (comprising
of) the process of learning to understand, utilise and
replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose
it and adapt it to local conditions and integrate it with
indigenous technologies’.6 At minimum, IPCC’s
description of EST transfer provides a vision of what
such transfer should entail. It is a transfer that should
transcend hardware transfer, facilitate sustainability,
emphasize capacity building, adaptability and
replicability of  ESTs, and leverage a polycentric
cooperative approach to EST development and
transfer. In this article, I demonstrate how the
UNFCCC EST transfer framework has historically
failed to satisfy the above objectives. Identifying five
phases of evolution of the UNFCCC EST
development and transfer framework, I seek to unmask
the continuing normative and structural flaws which
have made EST development both inequitable and
ineffective. In part II, I attempt to situate TWAIL in
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 1 Fiona Harvey, ‘Paris Climate Change Agreement: The
World’s Greatest Diplomatic Success’ (The Guardian, 14
December 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-
diplomacy-developing-united-nations>.
 2 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered
into force 4 November 2016) UNTS 54113 art 2(1)(a).
 3 As shown later in this article, compared to the relatively
clear divide between developed and developing States
at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development (UNCED), the divide is
currently less defined. See Jane Bulmer, Meinhard
Doelle and Daniel Klein, ‘Negotiating History of the
Paris Agreement’ in Daniel Klein and others (eds), The
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2017) 50-3.
4  Karin Mickelson, ‘Leading Towards a Level Playing Field,
Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental
Space: Three Stories About International Environmental
Cooperation’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 137.
5   The ‘EST development and transfer framework’ is used
in this article interchangeably with ‘transfer regime’. It is
distinct from its more restrictive usage under Article 10
of the Paris Agreement.
6 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in
Technology Transfer (Cambridge University Press 2000)
15-6.
the EST Transfer context. I reflect on the evolution of
the UNFCCC EST regime, commonalities and
differences in the different phases of evolution, and
the extent to which the current structure recycles
previous arrangements in part III. In part IV, I conclude
by highlighting key lessons from the evolution of the
transfer framework.
2
EST TRANSFER AND TWAIL: AN
OVERVIEW
TWAIL has no defined or generally accepted
methodology, approach or argument.7 Rather than
being a ‘monolithic collegium’,8  it is more like ‘a
chorus of voices that blend though not always
harmoniously, in attempting to make heard a common
set of concerns’.9 This ‘common set of concerns’
forms the core of  TWAIL as a theoretical tradition
and the band, however elastic, that links its proponents.
At the core of  the TWAIL orientation is the
acknowledgment that hegemony and domination in
international relations and law is a present and
continuing reality.10 TWAIL scholars, therefore,
deconstruct the history, structure and process of
international law from a third world perspective, with
the aim of giving ‘meaning to international law in the
context of the lived experiences of the ordinary peoples
of the third world in order to transform it into an
international law of emancipation’.11
The terms ‘developing states’, ‘global south’ and ‘third
world’, used interchangeably here, need to be unpacked
given their currently contested status. While the Group
of 77 and China (G77) purport to represent the
interest of the ‘global South’ in the climate change
regime, it is now contestable if there is any such
functional union. For example, while there was a
relatively effective collegium of G77 countries at the
1992 UNFCCC negotiations, years leading to the 2015
Paris Agreement saw the segmentation of the group
into autonomous negotiating entities with distinct
interests.12 Particularly, the economic resurgence of
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC States)
have raised the question of the correctness of
categorizing these countries as ‘developing’. While
these contentions are questionable, more so as the
determination of ‘development’ is primarily anchored
on a ‘growing’ macro-economy with little reference to
the quality of  life of  the citizenry, the developing –
developed categorization as used here is more nuanced.
The distinction is employed as what Rajagopal has
described as a ‘counter-hegemonic discursive tool’.13
In this article, the global south is representative of an
‘alternative and oppositional stance’ for a ‘fundamental
rethinking of international relations’.14 In this sense,
UNFCCC- EST Development and Transfer
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7  Antony Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches
to International Law and Individual Responsibility in
Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of
International Law 77.
8  Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A Twail
Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 23.
9  Karin Mickelson, ‘Taking Stock of  TWAIL Histories’
(2008) 10 International Community Law Review 355; Luis
Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and
Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of  International
Law’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 103.
10 Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings
of the American Society of International Law Annual
Meeting 31; Karin Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third
World Voices in International Legal Discourse’ (1998) 16
Wisconsin International Law Journal 353.
11 BS Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International
Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (2007) 8 Melbourne
Journal of International Law 499.
12 For the PA negotiation rounds, however, about twelve
diverse ‘factions’ emerged. These alliances are in
accordance with developing countries’ ‘changing political
and socio-economic conditions’. See Bulmer, Doelle and
Klein (n 3) 50 – 53.
13 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Locating the Third World in
Cultural Geography’ (2000) 15 Third World Legal Studies
1.
14 Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in
International Legal Discourse’ (n 10).
countries, like the BASIC States, are not automatically
‘Southern’ by reason of their geographical location,
history or economic status.15 For example, the status
of BASIC States as ‘third world’ is dependent on the
extent to which they reproduce and reinforce the
hegemonic ideals of the North. Ideals built on
neoliberalism, pre-eminence of the market, and what
Adrian Parr describes as the wrath of capital.16 This
approach, while still potentially qualifying entities in
TWAIL’s traditional domains (Africa, Asia and Latin
America) as ‘third world’, also allows for the bolstering
of third world ranks either through the inclusion of
entities in the ‘traditional north’ or the exclusion of
‘backsliding’ States in the ‘traditional South’. The
counter-hegemonic and alternative narrative spoken
of here should not be mistaken for singleness of
position, but rather diverse positions unified by a non-
capitalistic paradigm.17 To be clear, the argument
against the centrality of the market does not mean
that the market is irrelevant. Rather, as Polanyi has
argued, the economy is a socially embedded reality and
the ‘social good’ not the market should be in the
driving seat of  the economy.18
TWAIL, as applied here, is even more important in
EST development and transfer discourse. While ESTs
are not climate change’s silver bullet, they are essential
to both climate mitigation and adaptation. In
Figueres’s words, humanity’s ‘survival depends on our
improvement of technology’.19 Should such
technologies be subject to the normal workings of
the market and intellectual property (IP) rules? The
situation is even direr given the necessity to make ESTs
fitting to the peculiarities of places. According to
Shabalala, developing countries ‘do not present
sufficient markets for private actors to develop
technologies to serve their needs; and where
technologies exist and are protected by IP, they do not
present sufficient markets for right-holders to sell or
licence their technologies’.20 And one might be quick
to indict multinational companies (MNC) in the
‘global north’, it is worth querying how ‘global south’
MNCs have fared. While emerging economies like
China and India are becoming increasingly dominant
in the global EST industry,21 there appears to be no
marked difference in their approach to EST
development and transfer.22 But does the emergence
of China and India mean they should have the same
level of responsibility as ‘developed States’? Is there a
middle category between the ‘South’ and the ‘North’
that such emerging economies can occupy?
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15 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘International Law and Its
Discontents: Rethinking the Global South’ (2012) 106
Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law Annual Meeting 176.
16 Adrian Parr, ‘The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and
Climate Change Politics – Reflections’ (2015) 62
Geoforum 70.
17 Following Wright, capitalism as used here refers to an
economic system influenced by class relations and
relentlessly driven by profits. See Erik Olin Wright,
Envisioning Real Utopias (Verso 2010) <https://
www.aacademica.org/erik.olin.wright/46.pdf>.
18 Karl Polanyi, The C^reat Transformation (2nd edn,
Beacon Press 2001) <https://inctpped.ie.ufrj.br/
spiderweb/pdf_4/Great_Transformation.pdf> 46 – 47.
19 Christiana Figueres, former Secretary General to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) quoted by Catherine Saez, ‘Human
Survival Depends On Shared Technology, Says New UN
Climate Chief ’ (Intellectual Property Watch, 2010) <https:/
/www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/03/human-survival -
depends-on-technology-says-new-un-climate-chief/>.
20 Dalindyebo Shabalala, ‘Technology Transfer for Climate
Change and Developing Country Viewpoints on
Historical Responsibility and Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities’ in Joshua D Sarnoff (ed),
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Climate
Change (Edward Elgar 2016) 172.
21 Brett Relander, ‘Investing in Green Technology’
(Investopedia 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/
a r t i c l e s / i n v e s t i n g / 0 4 0 9 1 5 / i n v e s t i n g - g r e e n -
technologythe-future-now.asp>.
22 See generally Frauke Urban, ‘China’s Rise: Challenging
the North-South Technology Transfer Paradigm for
Climate Change Mitigation and Low Carbon Energy’
(2018) 113 Energy Policy 320.
The relevance of considering the history of the EST
transfer regime under the UNFCCC is aptly captured
by B.S. Chimni, who notes that ‘the road to the future
… winds its way through the past’.23 The unmasking
that TWAIL’s emphasis on history and continuity of
trends fosters, is crucial in climate change scholarship.
Attempts to narrate the history of the climate regime,
however, often divorce the regimes from their larger
socio-political context. Such historical accounts take,
as their starting point, either the 1972 Stockholm
Convention or the 1992 Rio Convention.24  This trend
is, however, not unique to climate change scholarship,
as other areas of international law have been criticized
for ‘cherry-picking’ history, divorcing them from their
broader contexts and equating western history to
global history.25 Crucial to the TWAIL agenda is the
unmasking of presumptions and representations that
underpin the global governance structure – in this case,
the UNFCCC EST transfer regime. Part III applies
TWAIL’s historical approach to take a more extensive
look at the evolution of the UNFCCC EST transfer
framework.
3
THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNFCCC
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FRAME-
WORK
Although the EST regime has evolved in form over
the years, I argue that common trends have been
replicated over its various evolutionary phases.
Examples include the developed-developing States
dichotomy and right - responsibility based
differentiation debate.  These, in turn, have resulted in
similar substantive results across the various phases. I
have grouped the evolution of the UNFCCC EST
transfer into five phases. The period considered covers
years leading to the making of the 1992 UNFCCC to
the establishment of the technology framework under
the 2015 Paris Agreement. It is worth noting that the
phases considered below are not insular. The different
periods bleed into one another. They have, however,
been phased in the manner below to capture major
initiatives designed to drive EST development and
transfer. Whereas not all transfer initiatives are covered,
the underneath phases represent key initiatives from
pre-1992 period to shortly after the 2015 Paris
Agreement. The regime continues to evolve. This
article, in part, provides a normative frame with which
the ongoing evolution can be studied in future works.
3.1 The Pre-1992 UNFCCC Phase
The ‘oil crisis’ and the failed attempt to enact an
International Code of  Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology (ICCTT), provides a start-point for the
analysis of the evolution of the UNFCCC technology
transfer framework. These two events occurred
between the 1960s and 1980s, a period marked by the
‘independence’ of colonized States and a gradual
sensitization of the world to the consequences of
North-induced global environmental degradation. The
argument is made below that the features of these
two events have, to varying extents, characterised the
various phases of the EST transfer regime, including
the current framework.
Attending the independence of colonized States in
the 1960s was their realization of the need to have
control over the natural resources within their
territories, particularly, oil and gas. Prior to this,
developed States, through multinational oil companies
(MNOCs), dominated these industries.26 The
UNFCCC- EST Development and Transfer
117
23 Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International
Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (n 11) 499.
24 See for example Daniel Blobel and others, United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Handbook (Climate Change Secretariat (UNFCCC) 2006)
<https://www.ecologic.eu/de/1911> 17-20.
25 Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International
Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (n 11) 500-502.
26 ‘OPEC/ : Brief History’ (OPEC 2020) <https://
www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm>; Ian
Mann, ‘Shaky Industry That Runs the World’ (archive.vn,
2010) <http://archive.vn/ZOHoz>.
to ‘renewable energy’ and ‘energy efficiency’, two of
the most prominent categories of  ESTs, became
central to OECD member states’ energy policy.
The above, in part, qualifies for a vital but often untold
part of the history of how renewable energy gained its
prominence in the North, and invariably, the world.
Economic imperatives actuated the actions of  the West
in respect to sustainable technologies, not
environmental concerns. The need for energy security
informed the recourse to renewable energy and
efficiency practices.33 This economic underpinning
remains extant today, although the more altruistic
rhetoric of environmental sustainability is harped on.
Take, for example, Germany’s energy transition
programme – energiewende – of the six reasons given
for the transition, five pertained to the German
economy.34 On green economy, the publication on
the programme notes that ‘Germany … is positioning
itself as an innovator in green technologies … exports
made up for 65 percent of German PV production in
2013 … and the target is 80 percent in 2020’.35 The
point is not that the economy cannot benefit from
sustainable energy, but that if  the economy is given a
‘first-line-charge’ right, the environment, and by
extension, humanity, will end up holding the shorter
end of  the stick. To frame the development and
management of  ESTs in the context of  economic
formation of OPEC and the recognition of the
permanent sovereignty of States over their natural
resources by the United Nations(Resolution
1803(XVII)), along with the heavy dependence of the
North on fossil fuel from developing States, set the
stage for the oil-rich developing States to leverage their
control over oil and gas supply as a tool of political
persuasion of the North. This has been referred to as
the ‘oil weapon’.27 Developing countries, at various
times, including 1956, 1967 and 1973, employed the
‘oil weapon’.28 The effects of the 1973 oil embargo
exemplify the far-reaching implications of these actions
and the eventual influence they had on the North.29
Incidences like the 1973 embargo led to the
establishment of the Energy Coordinating Group
(ECG) under the umbrella of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in 1974.30 The ECG’s central mandate was ‘…(the)
shift from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market by the
enforcement of oil-saving measures and the switch to
other energy sources’.31 As reiterated in the enabling
instrument of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
(which replaced the ECG), OECD countries agreed to
undertake ‘long-term cooperative efforts on
conservation of  energy, on accelerated development
of  alternative sources of  energy, on research and
development in the energy field…’32 Hence, recourse
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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27 Defined as ‘any manipulation of price and/or supply of
oil by exporting nations with the intention of changing
the political behavior of the consumer nations’. See
Hanns Maull, ‘Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon
Examined: Introduction’ in G Treverton (ed), Energy
and Security (Gower Publishing 1980) 3.
28 The 1956 Suez Canal crisis, 1967 Suez Carnal blockade,
1973 Arab-Israeli war and the perceived anti-Arab stance
of western countries resulted in Organization of Arab
Petrol Exporting Countries (OAPEC) cutting back
supplies of oil to the west. See generally Sanam S Haghighi,
Energy Security (Hart Publishing 2007).
29 ibid 54.
30 The ECG later became the International Energy Agency
(IEA). See Richard Scott, The History of the International
Energy Agency 1974 – 1994: Origins and Structure, vol 1
(OECD 1994) 47-8.
31 Henri Simonet, ‘Energy and the Future of Europe’ (1975)
53 Foreign Affairs 454.
32 Agreement on an International Energy Program (as
amended 30 November 2007), Preamble IEP.
33 Winston Churchill is reputed to have remarked that ‘on
no one quality, on no one process, on no one country,
on no one route and on no one field must (the United
Kingdom) be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie
in variety and variety alone’. Quoted in Daniel Yergin,
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power
(Simon and Schuster 1999) 160.
34 Craig Morris and Martin Pehnt, The German
Energiewende Book (Heinrich Boll Stiftung 2017)
<https://lifeaftercoal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/
2017/07/Morris-et-al-German-Energy-Transition.pdf>5.
35 ibid 11.
dominance and GDP growth invariably impacts how
such technologies are dealt with. The stronger the
economic objective, the lesser the willingness to have a
non-market-oriented transfer structure.
Another development that attended the ‘independence’
of developing States in the 1960s is the formation of
the G77 in 1962.36 At ‘independence’, previously
colonised States realised that political autonomy in
itself does not translate into development.37 They
indicted the North-centric international order which
had been designed, without the input of the South,
to advance the interest of the North.38 Hence, they
called for a reformed international order which
guarantees the South’s right to development.39
According to Doudou Thiam, this right mandates
the tearing down of practices, institutions and rules
on which unjust and exploitative international
economic relations are based.40 Subsequently, the
Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) was made in
1974.41 The Declaration, in part, demanded access to
the ‘achievements of modern science and technology’
and the creation of indigenous technologies in
accordance to procedures suited to their economies.42
To operationalize the NIEO Declaration, the UNGA
adopted a programme of action.43 Item IV of the
Programme requires that efforts must be made to
formulate and draft the International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of  Technology (ICCTT).44
The negotiation of the ICCTT was extensively
impacted by the developed – developing States
dichotomy. While the G77 proposed a mandatorily
couched code which covers all forms of technology
transfer regardless the status of  parties (e.g. private or
public bodies), developed States proposed a non-
binding instrument with clear distinction between
parties.45 Again, there was an all-out contradiction in
the normative bases of both groups’ negotiating
positions. While the North advocated for a regime
based on liberal economic principles, ‘the South
considered technology as the common heritage of all
mankind’.46 The position on intellectual property
UNFCCC- EST Development and Transfer
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36 g77, ‘Origin of The Group of 77’ (2020) <http://
www.g77.org/paris/history/pdf/historyG77.pdf>.
37 Mutua (n 10) 34.
38 See generally M Rafiqul Islam, ‘History of the North–
South Divide in International Law: Colonial Discourses,
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination’ in Carmen G
Gonzalez and others (eds), International Environmental
Law and the Global South (Cambridge University Press
2015) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/
international-environmental-law-and-the-global-south/
history-of-the-northsouth-divide-in-international-law-
colonial-discoursessovereignty-and-selfdetermination/
CF4988C74A64BEA8FCB9E4CC363B92EF> 23 – 49. See
also BS Chimni, ‘Customary International Law: A Third
World Perspective’ (2018) 112 American Journal of
International Law 1.
39 Daniel J Whelan, ‘“Under the Aegis of Man”: The Right
to Development and the Origins of the New International
Economic Order’ (2015) 6 Humanity: An International
Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and
Development 93.
40 Doudou Thiam’s (former Senegalese Foreign Minister)
Address to the UNGA, UNGA Off. Records. 21st Sess.,
1414th Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1966 cited in
Whelan, ibid.
41 See, UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI),
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, 1 May 1974, UN Doc A/RES/S-6/
3201 (NIEO Declaration).
42 ibid para 4(p).
43 UN General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI), Programme
of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, 1 May 1974, UN Doc A/RES/S-6-
3202.
44 For a comprehensive commentary on the history of the
ICCTT, See generally Surendra J Patel, Roffe Pedro and
Abdulqawi A Yusef  (eds), International Technology
Transfer, the Origins and Aftermath of  the United
Nations Negotiations on A Draft Code of Conduct
(Kluwer Law International 2000) <https://
lrus.wolterskluwer.com>.
45 Dennis Thompson, ‘An Overview of  the Draft Code’ in
Patel, Pedro and Yusef  (eds), ibid  52-8.
46 Joel Davidow and Debra Miller, ‘Antitrust at the United
Nations: A Tale of  Two Codes’ in Patel, Pedro and Yusef
(eds), ibid 86.
rights (IPRs) is also telling. While the South contended
stridently that IPRs are constricting development and
technology transfer, the North took the position that
IPRs and the monopolies they engender are ‘necessary
evil to foster invention’.47 The attempt of the South
to negotiate technology transfer outside the aegis of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
was also resisted by the North.48 Importantly, although
in one breath calling in aid the autonomy of
Transnational Companies (TNCs) vis-à-vis the right
to transfer technologies, developed States represented
the interests of the TNCs in the negotiations.49 And,
although it failed, the final draft of the ICCTT
represented, in the main, the position of developed
States, with developing States either having to forego
their positions or water them down for acceptability.50
However, even the compromises made by developing
States had to be pro-economy before they could be
accepted.51
The above features substantially characterise the EST
transfer regime. This is not surprising, as the same
normative bearings of States informed the positions
taken at the negotiation of the climate regime. This
reinforces the argument earlier made that developed
States’ climate initiatives are primarily market centric.
This conclusion would have been different if the
existential implications of climate change had
Law, Environment and Development Journal
influenced a position different from the one taken by
developed States in the more generic ICCTT
negotiation. Put together, the two pre-1992 events
considered above form the foundation of the
subsequent phases of the global EST transfer regime.
A position well explained by Derrick Bell’s Interest
Convergence Dilemma Theory.52 Although proffered
in a context of the critical race movement, the theory
can be aptly applied to the climate change discourse.
Bell argues that ‘the interest of blacks in achieving
racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of the whites’.53 Applied
in the climate change context, the dilemma implies
that until the North’s economic and hegemonic agenda
is served, it generally lacks the will to contribute to
non-economic causes.54
3.2 Pre-Expert Group on Technology
Transfer Phase (1992 – 2000)
The 1992 UNFCCC, the Rio Declaration and Agenda
21 provide the ‘gold standard’ for global EST transfer,
a standard which has been increasingly fallen short of.
The concept of differentiation was most evident in
this era. The UNFCCC, and subsequently, the Kyoto
Protocol, generally delineated States Parties into Annex
120
47 ibid 86-7.
48 ibid 88.
49 As noted elsewhere, in the ICCTT negotiations ‘…most
highly industrialized States, … either identified with the
needs of suppliers (TNCs) or responded to their
lobbying’. ibid 86. See also, UNCTAD Secretariat, ‘The
Rationale for Regulatory Action’ in Surendra J Patel, Pedro
Roffe & Abdulqawi Yusuf  (eds), International Technology
Transfer: The Origins and Aftermaths of  the United
Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct
(Kluwer Law International 2001) 3-16.
50 Davidow and Miller (n 46) 84-85.
51 For example, while the South clamoured for a binding
instrument, the North want a non-binding instrument.
In reaching a consensus on a ‘non-binding’ ICCTT,
developed countries agreed with OPEC nations to
completely exclude intergovernmental cartels from being
caught by the anti-trust code under the Restrictive
Business Practices (RBP) Code. See ibid. 83.
52 Derrick A Bell, ‘Brown v. Board of  Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law
Review 518.
53 ibid 6, 8.
54 A similar point was made in respect of the overall
acceptance and popularity of the Montreal Protocol.
Harris notes that the U.S industry was the first to develop
substitutes for ozone depleting substances, and the
economic incentives that industry had, were some of
the reasons for the success of the Montreal Protocol.
See Paul Harris, ‘Collective Action on Climate Change:
The Logic of Regime Failure’ (2007) 47 Natural
Resources Journal 195. 211.
I, Annex II and non-annex States.55 While Annex I
included developed States and other countries
described as economies-in-transition (EIT), annex II
was primarily made up of developed States.56 In the
EST transfer context, this distinction is important, as
it helps to understand the obligations agreed to by
States under the climate framework. Art. 4(1)(c) of the
Convention starts by mandating all States to promote
and cooperate in the development and diffusion of
ESTs. But as noted above, Art. 4 (5) of  the
Convention more particularly provides that ‘the
developed country Parties and other developed Parties
included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the
transfer of, or access to (ESTs)’. Further, under the
UNFCCC, there is a clear linkage between EST transfer
and finance and it explicitly makes the effective
implementation of developing States’ commitments
under the Convention contingent on the effective
implementation of developed country parties’ financial
and technology transfer commitments.57 Article 4(3)
and (5) of the UNFCCC is the product of the same
contestations between developing and developed
States which characterized and, arguably, led to the failed
attempt to enact the ICCTT.
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are not binding
instruments. However, they provide more clarity and
specificity on the EST transfer commitments of parties
under the UNFCCC.58 Principle 9 of the Rio
Declaration admonishes states to co-operate in
strengthening endogenous capacity building, in
improving scientific understanding and enhancing the
development and transfer of technologies. Chapter
34 of Agenda 21 provides captures the understanding
of  State Parties on EST transfer in Rio.59  The difficult
and tactful melding of different positions of
developing and developed States is evident in various
paragraphs of Chapter 34. For example, paragraph
34.14 states that the objectives of Chapter 34 include
the promotion, facilitation and financing of EST
transfer on concessional and preferential terms and
the protection of IPR. Paragraph 34.14 embraces the
insistence of developing States on the transfer of
technology on ‘concessional and preferential terms’,60
even as developed States pressed for the protection of
IPRs.61 Agenda 21 attempts to provide workable
solutions in response to these seemingly irreconcilable
differences. The proposed initiatives include:
i. The development and linkage of
international information networks
through regional clearing-houses.62
ii. Provision of incentives by developed
countries to companies, purchase of
patents to transfer to developing countries
and the prevention of the abuse of IPRs.63
iii.Establishment of  international ESTs
research centers.64
iv. The promotion of  joint ventures between
suppliers and recipients of technologies.65
UNFCCC- EST Development and Transfer
121
55 See generally UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), New York, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS
107, art. 4, Annexes I & 2; Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Kyoto, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162, arts. 1(7) &
11(2).
56 See UNFCCC (n 55) Annexes I and II.
57 See UNFCCC (n 55) art. 4(3), (5) & (7).
58 It has been argued that although unbinding, the Rio
Declaration has ‘the same potential as did the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights’, which (UDHR) later
became deemed as part of  customary international law.
See RS Pathak and Akshay Jaitly, ‘Rio Declaration -
Economic Issues for Developing Countries’ (1992) 1
Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law 267.
59 Agenda 21, para 34.6 states that the chapter is ‘without
prejudice to specific commitments and arrangements
on transfer of technology to be adopted in specific
international instruments’.
60 See for example Statement of HE Mr Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Report
of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, Statements Made by Heads of State
or Government at the Summit Segment of the
Conference, A/CONF.151/26/Rec.1 (Vol. III).
61 See United States Submission, Report of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. IV).
62 Agenda 21, Report of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14
June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26, para 34.15.
63 ibid para 34.18(e).
64 ibid para 34.21.
65 ibid para 34.28.
The non-actualization of the lofty aspirations of
Chapter 34 cannot be divorced from the divergence
between developed and developing States on the
principles that should underpin EST transfer. For
example, while developing States at UNCED
emphasised the relationship between development and
environment and the responsibility of the North to
do away with policies which impede the transfer of
ESTs, western countries emphasised market policies,
with Germany and the United Kingdom particularly
referencing the then ongoing negotiations on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
subtly tying aid to ‘policies which encourage inward
investment, including …the principles of good
government’.66 It was in the light of this unresolved
conflict that the Secretary-General of  UNCED, Maurice
Strong, noted that while there was an agreement on
technology transfer, there was unclarity on the principles
of the agreement.67
Indeed, after the coming into force of the UNFCCC
in 1994, the unreadiness of State Parties to implement
the agreement, principles and action plan on EST
transfer became apparent. It is worth noting that in
the phase under consideration, the SBSTA was the
body overseeing EST transfer initiatives. This is
instructive, as the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) is only an advisory
rather than an implementing body. Thus, the focus of
the UNFCCC in this phase was essentially consultative.
Issues that recurred in the various COP Decisions on
EST transfer included the need for Annex II countries
to include in their national communications measures
taken for the transfer of technology; the need for
technology needs assessment (TNA) of developing
countries; the need for the development of
international technology information centres (clearing
houses); and the central role of the private sector in
facilitating transfer.68 There was, however, a subtle
shift from emphasising provision of information by
home and host States to the development of the local
absorptive capacity of the host state at COP 4 in Buenos
Aires.69 COP 4 led to the development of the Buenos
Aires Plan of Action and the establishment of a
consultative process under the SBSTA.70
Despite these activities, little was done as regards
implementation. This can be gleaned from SBSTA’s
compilation of parties’ submissions in 199971 and
report on the status of the consultative process
(submissions from parties) in 2000.72 For example,
the position paper of  the G77 mirrored, substantially,
where developing countries were in 1992.73 As in 1992,
developing countries were still clamouring for
inventories of  ESTs from developed States,
establishment of a technology transfer clearinghouse,
provision of financial assistance, the initiation of pilot
projects and the establishment of a dedicated fund
within the financial mechanism to aid capacity building
and effective transfer in the year 2000.74 Again, the
developed – developing States tension was evident in
this phase. For example, while the G77, in their 2000
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66 See the submissions of the Heads of Governments/
States of  India, Malaysia, Tanzania, Vanuatu and G77 (n
60) 1-3, 230-3, 187, 208 and 152-5. respectively. See also
the submissions of Germany and Great Britain. See (n
61) 28 and 27.
67 See Statement of Maurice F Strong, Report of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. IV).
68 See Decision 12/CP.1, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1;
Decision 7/CP.2, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1; Decision
9/CP.3, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1; Decision 4/CP.4,
FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 and Decision 9/CP.5,
FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add. 1.
69 See Decision 4/CP.4, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1, paras
1 and 4.
70 See ibid Decision 1/CP.4, ibid & Decision 4/CP.4, para
9.
71 SBSTA, 10th Sess., (1999) Development and Transfer of
Technologies – Submissions from Parties: Part One,
FCCC/SBSTA/1999/MSC.5.
72 SBSTA, 13th Sess., (2000) Development and Transfer of
Technologies – Status of  the Consultative Process
(Submission of Parties) <https://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2000/sbsta/misc04.htm>.
73 See, Paper No. 3: Group of  77 and China, ibid.
74 ibid.
Transfer (EGTT) and adoption of  the Framework
for Meaningful and Effective Actions to enhance the
Implementation of Article 4(5) of the Convention
(Framework).80 The terms of reference of the EGTT
included analysing and identifying ‘ways to facilitate
and advance technology transfer activities’.81 The
Expert Group was to report to the SBSTA, and its
progress and continued relevance were to be appraised
after five years (COP 12).82 Arguably, the framework
established under COP 7 marked the clearest transition
in the focus of the global EST transfer regime. It is
worth recalling that under the UNFCCC and Rio 21,
there was a recognition that while developing countries
must develop absorptive capacities and enabling
environment, a responsibility lies with developed
States to ensure access to and availability of  ESTs.
Under the COP 7 Technology Transfer Framework,
however, it was stated under the header ‘Overall
Approach’, that ‘the successful development and
transfer of  ESTs and know-how requires a country-
driven, integrated approach, at a national and sectoral
level’.83 Consistent with this focus, the Framework
emphasised TNA, technology information, enabling
environments, capacity building and mechanisms for
technology transfer, as its five components.84
The argument here is not as to the inappropriateness
of the identified components, but more on the reversal
of roles. Indeed, while reference was made to the
‘supportive’ role to be played by developed countries,
these roles were, at best, only passively framed.85
communication, noted that the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
‘shall not be seen as a mechanism to implement Article
4.5 of the Convention’,75 the United States portrayed
the CDM as providing ‘important incentives to
enhance the transfer of  ESTs and the implementation
of Article 4.5’.76 Again, the G77 demanded the
establishment of  a Transfer of  Technology Mechanism
with institutional and funding sub-mechanisms;77 a
proposal which did not garner the support of
developed States. As noted earlier, one of the
emphases of the COP decisions between 1995 and
2000 was the conduct of TNAs in developing States.
There were, however, no commensurate
implementing initiatives to assessed needs. For
example, in 1998, the SBSTA conducted a survey of
technology needs with an extensive participation of
developing States.78 The survey highlighted energy,
transportation, agriculture, forestry and coastal zone
management as the key areas of  needs of  surveyed
countries.79 As will be seen later, successive TNAs
conducted in subsequent years made similar findings,
indicating that little or nothing was done in actioning
the TNA findings made.
3.3 The Expert Group on Technology
Transfer Phase (2001–2007)
COP 7 which was held in Marrakesh in 2001 is generally
believed to be another landmark in the international
climate regime. The Marrakesh Accords, which included
extensive decisions on capacity building and EST
transfer, were some of the stand-out features of the
Conference. More importantly, however, is the
establishment of  the Expert Group on Technology
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75 ibid.
76 SBSTA (n 72).
77 ibid.
78 SBSTA, 8th Sess., 1998, Development and Transfer of
Technologies – Technology and Technology
Information Needs Arising from the Survey of
Developing Country Parties, FCCC/SBSTA/1998/INF.5.
79 ibid.
80 See Decision 4/CP.7, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, paras
1 & 2.
81 ibid para 2. See also, ‘Terms of  Reference to Expert
Group on Technology Transfer’, Appendix to Decision
4/CP.7, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1.
82 ibid.
83 ‘Framework for Meaningful and Effective Actions to
Enhance the Implementation of Article 4, Paragraph 5,
of  the Convention’, Annex to Decision 4/CP.7, FCCC/
CP/2001/13/Add.1, para 2.
84 ibid paras. 3-22.
85 For example, the Framework stated that ‘…… Developed
country parties … are urged to facilitate and support the
needs assessment process, recognising the special
circumstances of least developed countries’. ibid para 5
& 6.
Although the Framework nibbled at various
provisions in Chapter 34 of Agenda 21, it marked a
substantial move away from Agenda 21’s lofty
aspirations. For instance, it was silent on the initiatives
to be taken by developed States to get around the
patent barrier which Chapter 34 clearly articulated.
Worth noting also is that while financial support was
referenced under different components, it was not
made a stand-alone component. When it is appreciated
that when the G77 proposed the technology transfer
mechanism in 2000, it identified funding as one of
two sub-components,86 the ancillary role given to it
under the Framework becomes more suspect. Despite
the foregoing, the EGTT phase signalled a step away
from the inertia of  the pre-EGTT phase. Significantly,
in attempting to meet Chapter 34’s recommendation
of the establishment of an information clearinghouse,
an online platform - TT: CLEAR – was developed in
2001. Like the Framework, however, TT: CLEAR is
another example of the watering down of the
intentions of Chapter 34. The platform contains more
information on the institutional working of the
UNFCCC and its specialized bodies, than it does on
information on ‘available technologies, their sources,
their environmental risks, and the broader terms under
which they may be acquired’.87
The EGTT’s most substantial achievement is, perhaps,
the standardization of the TNA process for developing
countries.88 Further to this, the first synthesis report
on the technology needs of developing States was
published in 2006.89 It is necessary to point out the
similarities in the findings reached in the 1998 TNA
survey and 2006 synthesis report. For example, both
inquiries indicated energy, transportation, industry,
agriculture and forestry as the primary mitigation sectors
identified by developing countries.90 Again, finance
and information were ranked as the major barriers in
both reports.91 The second and third synthesis reports
compiled in 2009 and 2013 respectively made similar
findings as the 1998 and 2006 findings.92   This informs
a couple of conclusions. One is that, as noted earlier, it
shows that little or no action was taken on identified
needs, hence, the recurrence of the same needs over a
span of  about fifteen years. Two, it unmasks as
incorrect, the representation that TNAs are more
pivotal to EST transfer than the responsibilities of
developed States. Again, like the pre-EGTT phase, no
substantial progress was made to facilitate actual
transfer of  ESTs during the EGTT phase. This said,
however, one of  the phase’s bright spots is the
recognition of the need to more effectively link the
technology and financial mechanisms. Hence, it was
emphasised in COP 13 in Bali that the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), ‘as an operating entity
of the financial mechanism of the Convention, should
provide financial support for the technology transfer
framework’.93
3.4 The Poznan Strategy Phase (2007–
2020)
While the EGTT was reconstituted for five more years
in 2007,94 a more momentous development was the
establishment of the Poznan Strategic Programme in
86 SBSTA (n 72).
87 See ‘About TT: CLEAR’ <http://unfccc.int/ttclear/
about>. See also, Agenda 21, para 34.15.
88 See R Gross and others, Conducting Technology Needs
Assessments for Climate Change (UNDP 2004). See a
more recent version – Sarwat Chowdhury and others,
Handbook for Conducting Technology Needs
Assessment for Climate Change (UNDP 2010).
89 Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by
Parties not Included in Annex 1 to the Convention,
SBSTA, 24th Sess, FCCC/SBSTA/2006/INF.1 (2006) (First
Synthesis Report).
90 See Framework for Meaningful Actions (n 83). See also
ibid 31.
91 ibid.
92 See generally, Second Synthesis Report on Technology
Needs Identified by Parties not Included in Annex 1 to
the Convention, SBSTA, 30th Sess, FCCC/SBSTA/2009/
INF.1 (2009) (Second Synthesis Report) & Third Synthesis
Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties not
Included in Annex 1 to the Convention, SBSTA, 39th
Sess, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7 (2013) (Third Synthesis
Report).
93 Development and Transfer of  Technologies under the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice,
Decision 3/CP.13, UNFCCCOR, 2007, FCCC/CP/2007/
6/Add.1, 12 at 14.
94 ibid para 3.
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Technology Transfer (PSP) by the GEF.95 The PSP
was the result of  Decision 4/CP.13 reached in Bali
requesting the GEF to, ‘in consultation with interested
Parties … elaborate a strategic programme to scale up
the investment for technology transfer to help
developing countries…’96 Further to this mandate,
the GEF designed the PSP where it highlighted ‘three
funding windows’ to be supported under the
programme – TNAs, piloting priority technology
projects, and the dissemination of GEF experience
and successfully demonstrated technologies.97 The
GEF committed about $50 million to these windows,
with the technology demonstration (pilot) component
allocated four-fifth of the fund.98 Given its limited
fund, eligible countries were limited to receiving not
more than $1 – $3 million for a maximum of one
project. In 2010, the GEF proposed a Long-Term
Program on Technology Transfer (LTP) to COP 16.99
The LTP added two windows to the PSP: public-private
partnerships (PPPs) for technology transfer and
support for climate technology centres and a climate
technology network.100 Arguably, the PSP and LTP
are the closest developing States have gotten to their
clamour for a special fund for technology transfer since
the inception of the climate change regime. It is worth
noting that the PSP and LTP are also the first deliberate
efforts to give effect to the TNA conducted in or by
developing States, as both programmes tailored
funding to TNA findings.101 An obvious let-down,
however, is the project and funding constraint in the
programmes. It appears that the State-by-State funding
model of the GEF is inefficient considering its limited
resources. The prioritization of regional capacity
building and transfer of technology projects might be
a more sustainable pattern. For example, making an
investment in a research and development facility in
the West African region seems more effective than
funding specific technologies per country.102
Although designed to facilitate technology transfer,
Poznan is primarily anchored on investment strategies.
The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) in its
2015 review of Poznan notes that ‘only one of the
programme framework documents for the approved
programmes directly refers to technology transfer’.103
The mobilization of private investment is essential to
Poznan’s operations. Hence, its climate technology
transfer and finance centres are in multilateral
development banks (MDB).104 With the exception
of  the Finance and Technology Transfer Centre for
Climate Change of the European Bank for
95 The PSP was originally named ‘Strategic Program to
Scale Up the Level of  Investment in the Transfer of
Environmentally Sound Technologies’ by the GEF,
before it was changed by the COP. See Development
and Transfer of  Technologies, Decision 2/CP.14,
UNFCCCOR, FCCC/CP/2008/7/Add.1, 3.
96 See Development and Transfer of  Technologies Under
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Decision 4/
CP.13, UNFCCCOR, 2007, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1,
para 3.
97 Elaboration of a Strategic Program to Scale up The
Level of  Investment in the Transfer of  Environmentally
Sound Technologies, GEF, GEF/C.34/5. Rev. 1 (2008),
14 – 16.
98 ibid 14-15.
99 GEF, Implementing the Poznan Strategic and Long-Term
Programs on Technology Transfer (GEF 2012) <https:/
/www.thegef.org/sites/default/fi les/publications/
GEF_PoznanTT_lowres_final_2.pdf>6.
100 ibid 6.
101 GEF (n 97) 15.
102 While developing States possess unique technological
needs, a review of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd TNA synthesis
reports show some common trends in the needs
identified by these countries. See SBSTA, ‘Synthesis
Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties not
Included in Annex I to the Convention’ 24th Sess., 18 –
26 May, 2006, FCCC/SBSTA/2006/INF.; SBSTA, ‘Second
Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by
Parties not Included in Annex I to the Convention’ 30th
Sess., 1 – 10 June 2009, FCCC/SBSTA/2009/INF.; SBSTA,
‘Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs
Identified by Parties not Included in Annex I to the
Convention’ 39th Sess., 11 – 16 November 2013, FCCC/
SBSTA/2013/INF.7. See also Christina Chaminade and
Hjalti Nielsen, Transnational Innovation Systems
(ECLAC-GIZ 2011).
103 Subsidiary Body of Implementation, Evaluation of the
Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer:
Final Report by the Technology Executive Committee,
43rd sess., FCCC/SBI/2015/16, para 33.
104 ibid para 19. The Inter-American Development Bank,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Asian Development Bank, and African Development
Bank, house Poznan’s four regional pilot centre projects.
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Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the MDB
centres only facilitated access to finance rather than
offering financial instruments.105 Hence, there are no
investments on African Development Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank generated projects.106
The TEC notes that ‘without access to finance, project
generation will lose momentum, and their added value
through ability to function as project accelerators risks
being cast in doubt’.107 Making private investment
core to Poznan’s operation skews its relevance and
effectiveness among developing countries. Least
developed countries stand lesser chance of benefiting
considering their less attractive markets. In 2015, while
14 per cent (mitigation) and 25 per cent (adaptation)
of total international public climate finance went to
least developed and low-income countries, 65 per cent
(mitigation) and 43 per cent (adaptation) were
committed to middle income countries.108  To prevent
climate finance and technology transfer from becoming
another domain of the rich – poor divide, structures
like Poznan must be refashioned. Applying equal
requirements to unequal countries will increasingly
foster an inequitable climate finance and technology
transfer regime.
3.5 The Technology Mechanism and
Framework Phase (2010 - 2020)
The EGTT phase came to an end at the 2010 COP 16
in Cancun, two years before it was due for appraisal.109
The premature termination of the EGTT was
essentially due to dissatisfaction with its non-
implementation role.110 In 2008, the G77 and China
submitted a proposal to the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention (AWG-LCA) which had been constituted
the year before at Bali, Indonesia. A review of this
proposal is key to appreciating its difference from the
eventual make-up of the mechanism. According to
the G77, such mechanism is needed given the urgent
need for access to ESTs and the inhibition of  barriers
to transfer including limited financing.111
With this preface, a two-body mechanism made up
of  an Executive Body on Technology (EBT) and
Multilateral Climate Technology Fund (MCTF) was
proposed. The EBT was to be made a subsidiary body
of the Convention and should be supported by:
Strategic Planning Committee (SPC), Technical Panels,
Verification Group and Secretariat.112 The MCTF on
the other hand was to ‘provide technology-related
financial requirements as determined by the Executive
Body’. The proposal further envisaged a Technology
105 Technology Executive Committee, Updated Evaluation
of  the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology
Transfer, 18th Meeting, TEC/2019/18/4, para 67.
106 ibid para 68.
107 ibid para 69.
108 Paul Steele, ‘Development Finance and Climate Finance
– Achieving Zero Poverty and Zero Emissions’ (2015)
International Institute for Environment and
Development Discussion Paper <https://
pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16587IIED.pdf>. This is also the
trend under the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has
committed 65 per cent of its fund to middle income
countries like Mexico and India, while only 18 per cent
have gone to the poorest countries. See Sennan Mattar,
Stephen Kansuk and Tahseen Jafry, ‘Global Climate
Finance is Still Not Reaching Those Who Need it Most’
(The Conversation, 2019) <http://
theconversation.com/global-climate-finance-is-still-
not-reaching-those-who-need-it-most-115268>.
109 Reports of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth
Session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10
December 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, UNFCCCOR, 2010,
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para 124, (Decision 1/CP.16).
110 Shabalala (n 20) 184.
111 Proposal by the G77 & China for A Technology
Mechanism under the UNFCCC  http://unfccc.int/
f i l e s / m e e t i n g s / a d _ h o c _ w o r k i n g _ g r o u p s / l c a /
application/pdf/technology_proposal_g77_8.pdf>.
112 The SPC is to develop strategy for EST transfer; technical
panels are to generate and compile expert information
on subjects relating to capacity building and transfer;
verification group is to verify financial and technological
contributions and the Secretariat is to ‘support and
facilitate the activities of the Executive Body’. ibid 2.
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Action Plan (TAP) which would ‘include clear actions
and dates for the first three years, and will be updated
for successive three-year periods’.113 The TAP was to
‘support all stages of the technology cycle’ and develop
policies on public domain technologies, patented
technologies and future technologies.114   The proposal
also identified accessibility, affordability,
appropriateness, adaptability, provision of  full
incremental costs, adequacy and predictability of funds
and the removal of barriers for EST transfer, as the
guiding criteria of the mechanism.115 It is interesting
to note that TNA was not part of this proposal. Given
its exclusion, it is not farfetched to contend that
developing States do not give the same pride of place
to TNAs as done by developed States and the
UNFCCC.
The G77 and China’s proposed mechanism was, in
the actual sense, not novel, as it only summarised their
position from the ICCTT negotiation phase. It was,
therefore, not surprising that developed countries
rejected it. As noted elsewhere, developed countries
largely took a more commercial perspective to EST
transfer and were particularly ‘wary of concessions in
the technology discussions which could adversely
impact their competitiveness’ in light of China and
India’s growing technological capacity.116 A
compromise, in principle, was however reached at COP
15 in Copenhagen, where parties agreed to a
Mechanism consisting of  a Technology Executive
Committee (TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre
and Network (CTCN).117 These two components
were essentially a break-up of  the G77 proposed EBT,
with the MCTF component completely removed.
Despite this relative progress, various vital issues were
unresolved in Copenhagen. Chief among these are
linkage of the mechanism to finance118 and intellectual
property rights.119 While G77 and China wanted an
explicit linkage between the financial and technology
mechanisms, and the provision of new and additional
funding to meet the full incremental costs of
mitigation and adaptation, developed countries
wanted both regimes to remain distinct.120
Again, while developing States wanted the mechanism
to recognise IPRs as a barrier and sought the creation
of  initiatives like a ‘Global Technology Intellectual
Property Rights Pool for Climate Change that
promotes and ensures access to Intellectual Property
protected technologies and the associated know-
how…’, developed States insisted that no reference
should be made to IPRs in the text, preferring that
issues pertaining to IPRs are dealt with in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) context.121 Unsurprisingly,
the developed countries prevailed. Neither was there a
link between the technology and financial mechanisms
nor was any reference made to IPRs in the Technology
Mechanism (TM) agreed to at Cancun in 2010.
Although the linkage between the technology and
financial mechanisms has been part of ongoing
113 ibid 3.
114 ibid.
115 ibid 3.
116 ICTSD, ‘The Climate Technology Mechanism: Issues
and Challenges’ (2011) ICTSD Information Note
Number 18< https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/
04/technologymechanism.pdf>3.
117 Outcome of  the Work of  the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention: Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Chair,
Draft Decision -/CP.15, UNFCCCOR, 2009, FCCC/
AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.3, paras 7 - 20.
118 ibid paras 8, 14.
119 ibid para 17.
120 See Heleen de Coninck and Ambuj Sagar, ‘Technology
Development and Transfer (Article 10)’ in Klein and
others (eds) (n 3) 248, 263.
121 ICTSD (n 116) 17.
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conversations,122 progress has been slow.123 Hence,
‘securing sustained funding’ has remained the CTCN’s
most festering challenge.124 The TM also marks a break
from Chapter 34 of Agenda 21. For example, the
preamble to the TM which merely stated that ‘recalling
the commitments under the Convention, in particular
Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9’.125 Contrariwise,
virtually every other COP decision prior to Cancun
(COP 16) referenced Chapter 34. The content of the
TM leads to the presumption that the exclusion of
Chapter 34 was not indeliberate. Arguably, whereas
the TM was conceived to remedy the bare policy making
status of  the EGTT, it appears to have reincarnated it.
Again, although the CTCN is represented as the
implementation arm of the TM, while the TEC is to
be the policy making arm, the CTCN has been slow in
occupying this implementation space. As aptly put by
Shabalala, ‘…the CTCN does not have an
implementation mandate and, for the moment,
appears limited to providing advisory services to
developing countries’.126
The Paris Agreement established a technology
framework (TF) to provide ‘overarching guidance to
the work of the technology mechanism’.127 The
adoption text of the Paris Agreement provides a cue
as to what ‘overarching guidance’ means. The
Framework is expected to facilitate, inter alia, the
undertaking of technology needs assessment,
enhanced implementation of their results, enhanced
financial and technical support, assessment of
technologies for transfer, and the enhancement of
enabling environments to address barriers to
development and transfer of socially and
environmentally sound technologies.128 While it is
too early to assess whether the TF has succeeded in
facilitating the foregoing, the extent to which it reflects
these features can be assessed. Arguably, TF’s themes
– innovation, implementation, enabling environment
and capacity building, collaboration and stakeholder
engagement, and support – address the issues
identified in the Decision 1/CP. 21.129 However,
compared to the far-reaching contents of its negotiating
text, the TF in various ways reproduced previous
trends. For example, the negotiating text refers to
increasing the effective participation of developing
States in collaborative research, development and
demonstration; enabling access to ESTs in the private
sector through incentives to technology providers;
concrete targets, timelines, transformation metrics, and
reporting; development of methodology to identify
122 See UNFCCC, Linkages Between the Technology
Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the
Convention, <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
resource/cp24_auv_TM%20FM.pdf>.
123 It was reported that the president of COP 24 indicated
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress as per the linkage
between the technology and financial mechanisms. See
‘Linkage between the Technology and Financial
Mechanisms and the Informal Consultation
Effectiveness’ <https://sunyclimatechange.word-
p r e s s . c o m / 2 0 1 8 / 1 2 / 1 2 / l i n k a g e - b e t w e e n - t h e -
t echno logy -and- f inanc i a l -mechan i sms-and- the -
informal-consultation-effectiveness/>.  See SBSTA &
SBI, ‘Joint Annual Report of  the Technology Executive
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and
Network for 2018’ FCCC/SB/2018/2, para 108 – 109.
The absence of assured source of funding has been a
recurrent complaint of  the CTCN. See Joint Annual
Report of  the Technology Executive Committee and
the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2016,
SBSTA & SBI, 45th sess, FCCC/SB/2016/1 (2016); and
Joint Annual Report of  the Technology Executive
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and
Network for 2017, SBSTA & SBI, 47th sess, FCCC/SB/
2017/3 (2017).
124 SBSTA & SBI, 2018 Joint Annual Report, ibid para 129.
125 UNFCCCOR (n 109) 18. See also Coninck and Sagar (n
120) 2 – 3.
126 Shabalala (n 20) 184. See also Margaretha Wewerinke-
Singh and Curtis Doebbler, ‘“The Paris Agreement”
Some Critical Reflections on Process and Substance’
(2016) 39 UNSW Law Journal 1486.
127 Paris Agreement 2015, art 10(4).
128 Decision 1/CP. 21, Adoption of  the Paris Agreement,
FCCC/CP/2015/Add. 1, para 67. (Decision 1/CP. 21).
129 Technology Framework under Article 10, para 4 of  the
Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2018/L3 (annex).
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130 See generally, SBSTA, Updated Draft of  the Technology
Framework under Article 10, para 4, of the Paris
Agreement (6 September 2018) SBSTA 48.2, Agenda Item
5. (Updated Draft).
131 For example, rather than adopting the recommendation
for a linkage between the technology and finance
frameworks (Updated Draft, para 43(a)), the TF refers to
‘enhancing the collaboration …’ (TF, para 25(a)); and
instead of ‘collaboration with private sector and
strengthened partnerships between public and private
sectors’, (Updated Draft, para 37(b), the TF introduced
the qualification ‘on a voluntary basis’ (TF, para 20(b)).
132 Davidow and Miller (n 46) 85.
133 ibid.
134 Shalini Randeria, ‘Cunning States and Unaccountable
International Institutions: Legal Plurality, Social
Movements and Rights of Local Communities to
Common Property Resources’ (2003) 44 European
Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de
Sociologie 27.
135 ibid.
technologies ready to transfer; linkage of the technology
and financial mechanisms; and the provision of
enhanced financial and technical support for the
implementation of TNAs.130 The outright rejection
or watering down of the proposals in the negotiating
text in favour of a Framework which is considerably
light on details, reaffirms the interest convergence
dilemma earlier referred to. Generally, while exhortatory
and non-committal provisions are retained in the TF,
prospectively obligational provisions are either made
voluntary or rejected altogether.131
While the above historical analysis might not be
exhaustive, it provides a basis for certain conclusions
on the dynamics of the UNFCCC EST transfer
structure. Evidently, despite the different labels, little
has changed between the 1960s when the NIEO was
conceived and 2015 when the Paris Agreement was
signed. The positions of developing and developed
States have not changed, developed States’ positions
still shape and inform the regime, and economic
considerations still override existential concerns.
Further, there has been more focus on an appearance
of progress than actual progress. This is about the
only explanation for the reiteration of policies which
have been ineffective and the willingness of developed
States to only consent to proposals which have no
concrete impacts. What defies comprehension,
however, is why developing States, have over the years,
consented to ‘white-elephant’ agreements. A similar
question was posed by Miller and Davidow when the
‘global south’ agreed to the Restrictive Business
Practices Code, despite it reflecting neo-liberal ideals
and substantially leaving out proposals by developing
countries.132 These writers suggest that such an
agreement represented a shift, however little, from
where the countries were and after various stalemates,
it gives an appearance of foreign policy gains to their
domestic audience.133
One must, however, be careful not to brand
‘neoliberalism’ as a wholly ‘western’ construct; a ‘grand
scheme’ in which developing States are unwilling or
induced participants. Randeria drew the line between
developing states which are genuinely weak and others
which she describes as ‘cunning states’ – developing
states which have the capacity to invoke their sovereignty
in opposing policies or initiatives they consider
inimical.134 While it is also true that there is often
considerable external political and economic pressure
which informs the international commitments of
developing States, there are also instances, as Randeria
illustrates in the case of India, where developing States
push back against international organizations and
developed States.135 The key question is what inspires
developing States to wield the scimitar of sovereignty?
As found by Randeria and others, the interest of
‘capital’ is a major determinant of when and
129
howdeveloping States exercise their sovereignty.136
Arguably, if  the ‘actualized experience of  (third world)
peoples and not merely that of the states which
represent them’ were at the core of the engagements
of the developing States,137 the demands and
concessions made by developing States in the
international climate sphere would be radically
different.138
4
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM
HISTORY
No doubt, structures, initiatives, and processes have
changed under the UNFCCC EST transfer regime over
the years. However, the regime is still actuated by similar
principles and orientations which grounded previous
structures. The unreadiness to adopt a non-market
centric approach to the development and transfer of
technologies, the shielding of private entities in the
global north from transferring ESTs, the opposition
of developed states to addressing IPR connected
barriers to EST transfer, and the rejection of proposals
with prospects of making developing States partners
in the development of  ESTs rather than recipients, are
as relevant as they were during the failed negotiation
of the ICCTT in the 1980s, as they were in 2018 when
the UNFCCC Technology Framework was adopted.
Indeed, it is arguable that as far as EST transfer is
concerned, the current Technology Mechanism and
Framework phase represents a drawback on the gains
made in Rio in 1992.139 The mutation of the
differentiation principle under the Paris Agreement
has little or no positive impact on EST transfer.140 As
Ferreira notes, ‘the principle of  differentiation in IEL
does not fulfil the function of promoting a just global
socio-economic and political order’.141
The EST transfer regime reflects the normative clash
between the North and the South. Whereas the North
has insisted on the dominance of the marketplace,
developing states emphasise the right to develop, the
136 ibid 47. Chimni also refers to the dominance of
transnational capitalists in emerging economies. He
notes that the transnational capitalist class ‘used its
economic clout and ideological primacy to shape the
foreign economic policy of emerging powers’. Chimni
argues that this is a reason for the downward trend in
opposition from emerging economies to the ‘structures
of global capitalism and international laws and
institutions that support it despite continuing to be
subjected to imperialist exploitation’. See BS Chimni,
‘Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the
Twenty-First Century’ (2012) 14 Oregon Review of
International Law 17.
137 Anghie and Chimni (n 7) 78.
138 See for example Julia Dehm’s criticism of  the carbon
trading mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. She
notes that while commitments made by developed
states to reduce their emissions by 5 per cent was a
result of political negotiation, the flexibility
mechanisms (carbon trading, clean development
mechanism and joint implementation) were
underpinned by the imperative of aggregate economic
efficiency. The mechanisms were ‘based on the premise
that mitigation should take place where it is cheapest
to do so’. See Julia Dehm, ‘Carbon Colonialism or
Climate Justice: Interrogating the International Climate
Regime from a TWAIL Perspective’ (2016) 33 Windsor
Yearbook of  Access to Justice 129.
139 For example, while Agenda 21 recommended the
provision of incentives to EST right holders, the
recommendation was rejected and excluded from the
Technology Framework. See Agenda 21, para
34.18(1)(e)(i); Draft Technology Framework, para 28(d).
140 Differentiation is a foundational principle of the
international climate change regime. It is captured by
the concept – common but differentiated
responsibility principle (CBDR). A principle which
recognizes the different contributions of countries
(particularly developed countries) to global emissions
and the capacity to respond to mitigation (and adaptation
needs). See Paris Agreement 2015, art 2(1)(c); See Lavanya
Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2006)
86.
141 Patricia Galvao Ferreira, ‘Differentiation in International
Environmental Law’ in Cameron SG Jefferies and
others (eds), Global Environmental Change and
Innovation in International Law (Cambridge University
Press 2018) 21. For a more detailed critique of the Paris
Agreement, particularly on its iteration of the principle
of differentiation, see Julia Dehm, ‘Reflections on Paris:
Thoughts towards a Critical Approach to Climate Law’
(2018) 1 Revue québécoise de droit international 61.
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liability of the North, and the existential needs of
their people. But the regime’s history is also the story
of  Northern victory. The victory of  neoliberalism and
commercialism in a realm (climate change) that
admittedly threatens life as it is presently known. Worse
still is the supposition that developed States have
committed themselves to the climate change cause for
altruistic reasons, or that there is the will to do what
needs to be done to roll back the scourge. The above
analysis, from the pre-1992 phase to the current
technology mechanism phase, reveals that developed
States neither have the will nor interest in taking the
required steps in an imperilled world. Concessions are
made and proposals are supported by developed States
insofar as they do not implicate private entities or
impose obligations. And as demonstrated through
Bell’s interest convergence dilemma and Olson’s
collective action theory, developed States are also more
likely to support initiatives that confers benefits on
them. For example, the CDM was framed as a quid
pro quo arrangement. In return for climate change
mitigation projects, developed countries are awarded
certified emission reductions (CER). Although the
‘sustainable development’ of developing States was
stated in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and
developed states had referred to the CDM as a
platform for the transfer of  technology,142 it has been
noted that ‘the … driver of CDM is not technology
transfer but the generation of CERs to assist Annex I
parties to close the gaps in Kyoto commitments and
in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’.143 Hence, of
the 1000 projects surveyed in 2011, only about 20 per
cent of renewable energy projects conducted under
CDM resulted in ‘some level’ of technology
transfer.144
It is, indeed, contestable that the climate regime is a
product of North – South compromise.145 While this
might have some semblance of truth at the level of
one-off initiatives and projects, it appears less true at
the normative level. Aptly rendered elsewhere, ‘there
is a stark difference between cooperation based on
power, and cooperation based on solidarity’.146  What
has been at play in the climate change regime is the
‘cooperation of power’. The norm of the powerful
prevails, while the cherrypicked and modified requests
of  subaltern states are consented to. But these
‘consents’ are still defined and operated through the
norm of the powerful. The neoliberal ideal which
underpinned the North’s approach to the failed ICCTT
in the 1970s remains the same today. This neoliberal
norm is well articulated by B.S. Chimni who adapted
Karl Marx’s views on alienation to argue that ‘the
intrinsic and sacred unity between man and nature is
subjected to market fundamentalism, leading to the
dysfunctional commodification of nature …
(objectification of) both humans and nature in the
pursuit of  profit … Unsurprisingly, international
environmental law is unable to seriously respond to
the global ecological crisis’.147 For example, the
American delegates to UNCED argued that ‘the
American life-style is not up for negotiation’.148
Whether directly said or subtly implied, this has, to
various degrees, been the position of the North. For
example, while there is consensus that energy sources
must change, and efficient habits must be cultivated,
this must be done using the existing neoliberal
142 SBSTA (n 71) 5, 15.
143 Gary Cox, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism as a
Vehicle for Technology Transfer and Sustainable
Development - Myth or Reality?’ (2010) 6 Law,
Environment and Development Journal 181.
144 Igor Shishlov and Valentin Bellassen, ‘10 Lessons from
10 Years of  the CDM’ (2012) Climate Report 27 <https:/
/hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01151437>. Elsewhere,
Seres notes that about 30 per cent of projects under
the CDM involved some form of technology transfer.
See S Seres, E Haites and K Murphy, The Contribution
of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto
Protocol to Technology Transfer (UNFCCC Secretariat
2010).
145 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the
2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and
Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 493 506.
146 Mickelson, ‘Leading Towards a Level Playing Field,
Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental
Space’ (n 4) 170.
147 ibid 504.
148 Philip Elmer-Dewitt, ‘Summit to Save the Earth: Rich
vs. Poor’ (TIME, 1992) <http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,975656-9,00.html>.
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economic template.149 However, as noted by
Mickelson, ‘if the economy is ever-present and its
centrality unquestioned … the environment is almost
completely absent’.150 This argument is not that
economic development negates environmental
sustainability, but that the latter must enjoy primacy
over the former.
The structure of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime
also attests to the normative fault lines of the regime.
As shown above, while the present technology
mechanism and framework introduce new bodies
(CTCN and TEC), the bodies are yet encumbered by
similar challenges as their forebears (e.g. SBSTA and
EGTT). Particularly, the inadequacy of  funding.151 The
transition from one body to another appears to be
transitions in names but not in substance. The G77
2008 proposal had the potential to reverse the trend,
but it was opposed by the developed States. Again,
proposals made in the draft technology framework
which touch directly on incentivizing private entities
to transfer ESTs, and the participation of  developing
States in the development of transformational
technologies were rejected.152 While the need to link
the technology and financial mechanisms have been
recognised by the UNFCCC, the resistance of
developed States to a hard linkage between both
mechanisms further exemplifies absence of will. The
absence of such linkage is made evident by Dehm
who notes, in respect of  the UNFCCC and World
Bank (which serves as the trustee of  the Green Climate
Fund), that ‘a split between the political and the
economic in international law provides authorization
for different international institutions to address
themselves to different aspects of an international
issue’.153  The ‘political’ – ‘economic’ dichotomy is
also evident in the role played by the WTO as the
economic sphere on intellectual property rights and
the UNFCCC as the domain of political negotiation.
The absence of functional integration among these
bodies is a major structural fault line.
The proliferation of bodies with similar mandates
which end up being underfunded is another feature
of the UNFCCC EST regime. For example, despite
their similar mandates, the Poznan Strategy and the
TM exist and operate separately. Hence, TNAs are
conducted under the GEF (Poznan), TEC, and the
CTCN; Poznan has its own distinct climate technology
centres and climate technology network different from
the CTCN;154 and the GCF operates its own distinct
National Designated Authorities separately from the
CTCN’s National Designated Entities.155 Another
example is the separation of technology transfer from
capacity building, despite that the former is deemed to
include the latter. Indeed, the Paris Agreement
envisages a different institutional arrangement to
oversee capacity building.156
149 Henri-Count Evans and Rosemary Musvipwa, ‘The
Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement
and the Addis Agenda: Neo-Liberalism, Unequal
Development and the Rise of a New Imperialism’ in
Tor Halvorson and Hilde Ibsen (eds), Knowledge for
Justice: Critical Perspectives from Southern African-
Nordic Research Perspectives (African Minds &
Southern African-Nordic Centre 2017) 49.
150 Mickelson, ‘Leading Towards a Level Playing Field,
Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental
Space’ (n 4) 165.
151 See Coninck and Sagar (n 120) 263.
152 SBSTA (n 130) 7, 9.
153 Dehm (n 138)143.
154 GEF (n 99).
155 GCF, ‘What are the NDAs’ <https://
www.greenclimate.fund/about/partners/nda>.
156 See Paris Agreement 2015, art. 11(5). In its 2019 review
of Poznan, the TEC recommended the linkage of
different national entities (NDA, NDE, GEF focal point,
regional focal point and other national UNFCCC focal
points). It further admonished that the institutional
linkages between Poznan and the CTCN be
strengthened. It, however, notes that ‘other than
convening meetings, no other institutional linkages
were supported by the GEF’. See TEC (n 117), para
117(c), (d).
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Mickelson’s analogy of  how Americans rejected
aerosols to fight ozone layer depletion in the 1970s
vis-à-vis the approach taken in respect of climate
change, sums up the arguments made in this work.
She notes that ‘changing deodorants is a far cry from
changing lifestyles, and it is the latter that may be
required if a meaningful response to climate change is
to be crafted’.157 So far, what appears to have happened
in respect of the UNFCCC EST transfer regime is akin
to ‘changing deodorants’. Different ‘fragrance’, the
same ‘system’. After a while, the fragrance wears off,
and the ‘odour’ of ineffectiveness and inequity of the
current regime hits our collective ‘nostrils’. Even after
then, we only change the deodorant, as has been done
with the extant EST transfer framework. For progress
to be made in respect of global EST development
157 Mickelson, ‘Leading Towards a Level Playing Field,
Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental
Space’ (n 4) 169.
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